Culture, Display Rules, and Emotion Judgments by Matsumoto, David et al.
   
   
Psychology: the Journal of the Hellenic Psychological Society
Vol. 23, 2018
 
  
  Culture, Display Rules, and Emotion Judgments
Matsumoto David  
Choi Jungwook  
Hirayama Satoko  
Domae Akihiro  
Yamaguchi Susumu  
https://doi.org/10.12681/psy_hps.23014
 
  Copyright © 2020 David Matsumoto, Jungwook
Choi, Satoko Hirayama, Akihiro Domae, Susumu
Yamaguchi 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Matsumoto, D., Choi, J., Hirayama, S., Domae, A., & Yamaguchi, S. (2020). Culture, Display Rules, and Emotion
Judgments. Psychology: the Journal of the Hellenic Psychological Society, 23(1), 7-23.
doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/psy_hps.23014
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 05:03:53 |
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 05:03:53 |
The study of emotion judgments across cul-
tures forms a crucial basis for the universality 
of facial expressions of emotion (Ekman, 1972, 
1973; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson, 
& Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971). Studies examining 
categorical judgments of emotions are especially 
prevalent, involving judgments of posed and spon-
taneous faces, voice, and body postures presented 
in a range of modalities (e.g., slides, photographs, 
video, audiotape) to judges from many countries 
and cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).
One type of emotion judgment that has re-
ceived attention in the literature is intensity ratings. 
Unlike categorical judgments, which examine 
what emotions are perceived, intensity ratings ask 
how much emotion is present. The first study to 
document cultural differences in intensity ratings 
of facial expressions was Ekman et al.’s (1987), 
who showed the universal expressions of anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise to 
judges in ten cultures, who rated the intensity of 
the expressions. Post-hoc analyses indicated that 
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Asians perceived significantly lower intensity in the 
faces than non-Asians. 
To examine these findings further, it was nec-
essary to create a stimulus set of facial expressions 
expressed by people of visibly different cultures 
but that were equivalent in their physical signal-
ing properties (i.e., they had to have the same 
muscles innervated at the same intensity levels). 
These characteristics were necessary because 
when testing for cultural differences in judgments, 
observers in different cultures need to view stimuli 
expressed by people of their own as well as other 
cultures in a balanced design to test whether or not 
the observed differences are limited to judgments 
of people of their own or other cultures. Because 
the expressions used in Ekman et al’s (1987) study 
were all of Caucasian individuals, Asians knew 
immediately that the expressors were not of their 
own culture. Thus the Asians may have given low-
er ratings because of politeness in not wanting to 
attribute strong emotions to the faces they saw or 
because of ignorance about the expressions of 
people from obviously different cultures. Because 
most judgment studies until Ekman et al.’s (1987) 
were concerned with cultural similarities, this meth-
odological requirement was not an issue. But once 
researchers turned their attention to explicating the 
nature of cultural differences, the balance between 
the perceived culture of the expressor and the 
judge’s culture became a crucial issue (Matsumo-
to, 2002a).
We decided to follow the Asian v. non-Asian 
cultural difference in intensity ratings by examin-
ing American v. Japanese comparisons. Given 
the methodological requirement of a stimulus set 
involving Asian faces, we created the Japanese 
and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion 
(JACFEE; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), which in-
cludes 56 expressions, all by different individuals, 
of the seven universal emotions (the six above 
and contempt), half of which were expressed by 
Caucasians, the other half by Japanese (half male 
and half female within each). Most importantly, all 
expressions within each emotion were equivalent 
in the physical signaling properties according to 
FACS coding, ensuring that any judgment differ-
ences across expressors could not be confounded 
by differences in their expressions. 
In the first study using the JACFEE, American 
and Japanese judges saw the faces twice, first 
rating the intensity of seven emotion categories 
on each expression, and second rating its glob-
al intensity (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Yrizarry, 
Matsumoto, & Wilson-Cohn, 1998). The results on 
both ratings were the same: Americans gave sig-
nificantly higher ratings than the Japanese on an-
ger, happiness, sadness, and surprise, regardless 
of the culture of the expressor (contempt, disgust, 
and fear were not analyzed). These findings sug-
gested that ignorance or politeness were not the 
reasons why Asians had significantly lower ratings 
than non-Asians. Instead, cultural differences were 
probably due to differences in cultural rules of de-
coding emotions. 
These findings have been replicated (Matsu-
moto, 1990, 1991), and have also been obtained 
in studies involving judgments by members of oth-
er cultures including Hungary, Poland, Vietnam, 
and Sumatra (Biehl et al., 1997). They appear 
specific to intensity ratings of emotion, as other 
types of ratings do not produce the same findings 
(Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993). Researchers have 
generally interpreted these findings as occurring 
because of cultural display rules. That is, because 
Japanese are known to suppress their display of 
emotions, this rule probably leads them to sup-
press the interpretations of the strength of the 
emotions of others. 
Ratings of External Displays v. Internal Feelings
One limitation of the previous studies was that 
it was impossible to know whether the judges rated 
the intensity of the external display – the strength 
of the expression – or the internal feeling – the 
strength of the presumed subjective experience 
of the expressor. This distinction is important be-
cause it probably mirrors more closely the judg-
ments people make in real life. This limitation was 
addressed in a study involving American and Japa-
nese judges who saw the JACFEE and made three 
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judgments: a categorical emotion judgment, the 
intensity of the external display, and the intensity 
of the subjective experience of the expressor (Mat-
sumoto, Kasri, & Kooken, 1999). Americans gave 
significantly higher ratings than Japanese to exter-
nal displays, but the Japanese gave significantly 
higher ratings to internal feelings. Within-culture 
simple effects analyses indicated that the cultur-
al differences occurred because Americans gave 
significantly higher ratings to external displays 
than internal experience, but that the Japanese did 
not differ in their two types of ratings. Once again, 
these findings were interpreted as occurring be-
cause of cultural display rules: because the Japa-
nese are more likely to suppress their true feelings, 
they would be more likely to infer more subjective 
experience in others compared to Americans, who 
do not have the display rule to suppress their emo-
tions as much. The results clearly demonstrated 
the meaningfulness of distinguishing between the 
two types of ratings. 
In a subsequent study we examined if the cul-
tural differences in intensity ratings might be spe-
cific to the intensity level of the expressions being 
judged. All of the JACFEE expressions are full-face, 
high intensity expressions, and exit interviews of 
the Japanese participants suggested that they did 
not differ in their external and internal ratings be-
cause they inferred that the emotions must have 
been justified if the expressions were large and 
uninhibited. Likewise, debriefing of the Americans 
suggested that they inferred less internal intensity 
precisely because they were associated with high 
intensity expressions, reasoning that everyone 
knows that people exaggerate their expressions 
relative to their feelings. Thus, the expressors were 
probably not feeling the emotions as strongly as 
they showed on their faces.
To examine these possibilities, it was neces-
sary for us to create stimuli of different intensity lev-
els but that included the same muscle movements. 
This was possible by utilizing computer morphing 
technologies. Using the JACFEE expressions and 
their corresponding neutral expression by the 
same individual as 100% and 0% anchors, we 
created low (50%) and very high (125%) intensity 
expressions for four emotions (anger, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise), and compared American 
and Japanese judgments of these (Matsumoto et 
al., 2002). Americans and Japanese did not differ 
in their ratings of neutral expressions; for high and 
very high intensity expressions, the Americans rat-
ed external display significantly higher than inter-
nal experience, while there was no difference for 
the Japanese, replicating the previous finding. For 
low intensity expressions, there were no differenc-
es between the two ratings types for Americans; 
the Japanese, however, gave significantly higher 
ratings to internal experience than to external dis-
play. 
These results were once again interpreted as 
occurring because of cultural display rules. On 
one hand, when judging low intensity expressions, 
Americans did not differ in their ratings because 
they most likely inferred that the expressor was 
probably feeling the emotion at a level commen-
surate with the expression. When judging high 
and very high intensity expressions, however, the 
Americans probably judged that the expressers 
were exaggerating their expressions relative to 
their true feelings, commensurate with such dis-
play rules. On the other hand, when the Japanese 
judged low intensity expressions, they probably 
interpreted that the person was suppressing their 
emotions and really felt more emotion than they 
were showing. When judging high and very high 
intensity expressions, they probably felt that the 
person may have been justified in displaying such 
strong emotions.
The Need to Measure Display Rules
The studies reviewed above were all limited by 
the fact that none actually measured cultural dis-
play rules despite their importance in the interpre-
tation of every cultural difference in judgment ob-
served. Previous interpretations have essentially 
been speculations with no basis in empirical fact. 
The only way to be certain that the cultural differ-
ences in intensity ratings occurred because of cul-
tural display rules is to actually obtain display rules 
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and emotion judgments in the same study and to 
assess the effect of the display rules on the cultural 
differences in ratings either through a regression 
or covariance analysis. The studies below do so.
It makes theoretical sense to link display rules 
with intensity ratings. The process of enculturation 
is wrought with occurrences in which behaviors 
are socialized, reinforced, or extinguished. During 
this time individuals not only learn which behav-
iors are appropriate and not for themselves; they 
are also creating cultural filters with which to judge 
and evaluate the behaviors of others (Matsumoto & 
Juang, 2013). What is appropriate and not for one-
self becomes one of the standards by which the 
behaviors of others are judged. While this makes 
conceptual sense across a wide range of psycho-
logical phenomena, within the realm of emotion 
the appropriateness of behaviors is represented 
by display rules and cultural filters are represented 
by judgments of the emotions of others. 
The Contribution of Psychological Culture
At the same time, there is a need to unpack-
age the psychological contents of culture and to 
examine the degree to which those contents affect 
emotion judgments. Cross-cultural theorists have 
made considerable strides in advancing knowl-
edge about the psychological dimensions that 
underlie culture, including individualism v. collec-
tivism, status and power differentiation, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity and femininity, tightness v. 
looseness, and contextualization (Hall, 1966, 1976; 
Hofstede, 1980, 1984; Pelto, 1968; Triandis, 1995; 
Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). 
Individual level measures of some of these con-
structs have been developed and their inclusion 
in research is important for several reasons. They 
allow researchers to check assumptions about cul-
tural differences underlying their samples, which 
often constitute individuals of different national 
or ethnic groups (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). They 
allow researchers to use the psychological level 
measures of culture as covariates that allow for a 
determination of the degree to which they account 
for cultural differences. To be sure, individual level 
measures of psychological culture are not culture 
as a macro-social concept, and the results of such 
endeavors need to be interpreted with that caveat. 
But they do provide researchers with the best esti-
mation of how culture, as an individual and psycho-
logical construct, affects their data.
In fact Matsumoto et al. (2002) included individ-
ual level measures of individualism v. collectivism 
and status differentiation in their study, and regres-
sion and covariance analyses indicated that these 
variables accounted for almost all of the original 
variance associated with the cultural differences in 
intensity ratings. At the same time, cultural display 
rules were not measured so it was impossible to 
know the degree to which the mediational effects 
of psychological culture could be explained by dif-
ferences in display rules. In Study 1, therefore, we 
included three measures of psychological culture 
along with a measure of cultural display rules to un-
package the cultural differences in intensity ratings 
of facial expressions of emotion.
Overview of the Current Studies
In Study 1, American and Japanese partici-
pants viewed the same expressions used in Mat-
sumoto et al. (2002) and made the same three 
judgments as in that study: a categorical emotion 
judgment, a rating of the intensity of the external 
display, and a rating of the intensity of the inter-
nal experience. The participants also completed a 
measure of cultural display rules and three mea-
sures of psychological culture. We hypothesized 
a significant culture by expression intensity by rat-
ing type interaction as was found in Matsumoto et 
al (2002). We further hypothesized that covariate 
analyses would indicate that cultural display rules 
and psychological culture would mediate the cul-
tural differences in ratings. 
In Study 2, we extended the findings from 
Study 1 by examining the degree to which a con-
cept related to cultural display rules, emotion regu-
lation, would mediate an expression level by rating 
type interaction in a sample of American judges.
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Study 1
Methods
Participants. The participants were 151 Amer-
icans (101 females, 50 males, mean age = 24.86) 
and 78 Japanese (33 females, 45 males, mean 
age = 20.95). The participants were recruited from 
psychology classes at large universities in San 
Francisco and Tokyo, respectively. All participat-
ed voluntarily and were born and raised in their 
respective countries, with English and Japanese 
their primary languages. 
Facial stimuli. The stimuli were 64 expressions 
adapted from Matsumoto and Ekman’s (1988) 
Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of 
Emotion (JACFEE), which were used in Matsumo-
to et al. (2002). Four expressors were randomly 
selected from the angry, happy, sad and surprised 
expressions and matched with their correspond-
ing neutral expression. Seven hundred thirty nine 
reference points were placed onto a digitized ver-
sion of each expression and its corresponding 
neutral. Of these, 28 were manually chosen on the 
outline of the face, 8 on the eyes, 8 on the brows, 
4 on the nose, 6 on the mouth, and 15 on the hair; 
the remainder was chosen randomly. With the 
JACFEE expression set at 100% and the neutral 
set at 0%, low and very high intensity expressions 
were generated by producing expressions with 
their reference points at 50% and 125%, respec-
tively, of the distance between the JACFEE neutral 
and high intensity expressions. All stimuli were in-
spected by coders trained in FACS to insure that 
they portrayed expressions that were anatomically 
possible and involved the same action units as the 
original expressions. The final set included 64 ex-
pressions – 4 emotions x 4 expressors x 4 intensity 
levels. 
Judgment tasks. Participants made three 
ratings for each expression. The first was a cate-
gorical judgment of the emotion they thought best 
described the expression, selecting a single choice 
from nine alternatives: anger, contempt, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, no emotion, 
and other. For “other” responses, a blank line was 
provided to allow open-ended responses. Partici-
pants also rated the intensity of the external display 
of the expression and the subjective experience of 
the expressor using two 9-point scales labeled 
None, 0, to A Lot, 8. The instructions for these rat-
ings were the same as those used in Matsumoto et 
al. (2002) and were as follows:
“Your task is to: (1) determine what emo-
tion if any is being displayed and to check 
the corresponding box using the scale 
provided. Please check only one box. If 
the emotion is not listed or if you believe 
multiple emotions are present, please write 
what you believe is being displayed on the 
blank line marked “Other.” (2) Indicate the 
intensity level of the facial expression and 
(3) indicate the intensity level of what you 
think the person is actually feeling using 
this 0 to 8 scale. Please choose only the 
numbers used on this scale.” 
Display rules. The Display Rule Assessment 
Inventory (DRAI), used in a previous cross-national 
study of display rules (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, An-
dayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998), was used to 
assess display rules. Participants rated how they 
would express 14 emotions in four relationship 
settings (family, close friends, colleagues, and 
strangers) in two domains – what they should do 
and what they actually do. The 14 emotion terms 
included each of the seven basic emotions (an-
ger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
surprise) and a synonym (hostility, defiance, aver-
sion, worry, joy, gloomy, and shock, respectively). 
Participants selected one of seven response alter-
natives, based on a theoretical range of possible 
behavioral responses (Ekman & Friesen, 1975):
1. Express the feeling as is with no inhibitions 
(Express).
2. Express the feeling but with less intensity than 
one’s true feelings (Deamplify). 
3. Express the feeling but with more intensity than 
one’s true feelings (Amplify).
4. Remain neutral; express nothing (Neutralize).
5. Express the feeling but together with a smile to 
qualify one’s feelings (Qualify).
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6. Smile only with no trace of anything else in or-
der to hide one’s true feelings (Mask).
7. Some other response (Other).
Multidimensional scaling of the response alter-
natives by a separate group of participants indicat-
ed that a single dimension of “control” described 
the differences among the responses (Matsumoto 
et al., 1998). The nominal data were thus recoded 
into the scalar values associated with each of the 
responses on the dimension, with higher scores 
reflecting greater control exerted by an individual 
to achieve the expression. Scores were then aver-
aged across both synonyms for each emotion (al-
phas across emotions within each social relation-
ship ranged from .90 to .93; alpha for total score 
used in covariate analyses below .95). 
Psychological culture. Participants complet-
ed the Individualism-Collectivism Interpersonal As-
sessment Inventory (ICIAI) (Matsumoto, Weissman, 
Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997), the Status 
Differentiation Scale (SDS) (Matsumoto, 2007), and 
the Self-Construal Scale (SCS) (Singelis, 1994). 
The ICIAI consists of 19 items rated in relation 
to four social relationships: family, close friends, 
colleagues, and strangers. Participants use a 
7-point scale, with higher scores reflecting great-
er collectivism. Scores are computed by averag-
ing across items within each relationship (alphas 
ranged from .81 to .89; alpha for total score used 
in covariate analyses below .92).
The SDS is a 20-item scale reflecting attitudi-
nal and behavioral tendencies in relation to inter-
actions with people at three different status levels 
(same, higher, lower) in two domains (work and 
school). Scores are computed by averaging across 
items within each status level and domain (alphas 
ranged from .85 to .89; alpha for total score used 
in covariate analyses below .92).
The SCS consists of 30 items measuring in-
dependent and interdependent self-construals (15 
items each). Participants use a 7-point scale to rate 
each item and scores are generated by averaging 
across the 15 items for both self-construals (alphas 
.78 and.75 for independent and interdependent 
construals, respectively). 
Demographic questionnaire. All participants 
completed a demographic questionnaire that asked 
about sex, age, place of birth and upbringing, length 
of living in their country, number of hours worked 
per week, marital status, religious background and 
affiliations, ethnicity, languages spoken, socioeco-
nomic status, and educational level. 
Procedures. Participants were tested in small 
groups and were given the DRAI and the demo-
graphic questionnaire prior to their coming to the 
laboratory. The judgment task and questionnaires 
were counterbalanced so that half of the participants 
in each culture did the judgment task first while half 
did the questionnaires first. For the judgment task, 
the task and answer sheets were explained and any 
questions answered. Three expressions not used 
in the main stimulus set were then shown one at 
a time, and participants rated these in order to fa-
miliarize themselves with the task. When all partici-
pants understood the judgment task, each of the 64 
expressions was shown one at a time, in a random 
order, for approximately 30 s each. Judges made 
their three judgments of each expression on answer 
sheets provided. When the participants completed 
the questionnaires, they were randomly ordered in 
a packet for each participant. 
Main Results
Cultural differences in intensity ratings. Ta-
ble 1 shows the percent of observers selecting the 
emotion category intended by each expression. 
We summed the intensity ratings across all four 
expressors within each emotion, expression in-
tensity, and rating type and computed a five-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) using country (2) 
and sex (2) as between subject factors and emo-
tion (4), expression intensity (4), and rating type (2) 
as within subject factors. For the main analyses we 
were concerned only with interactions of country 
and rating type. As predicted, the expression in-
tensity by country by rating type interaction was 
significant, F(3, 477) = 28.78, p < .001, r2 = .12. 
The country by rating type interaction was also 
significant, F(1,159) = 5.74, p < .01, r2 = .03. No 
other effects involving the country by rating type 
interaction were significant. 
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Emotion Expressor Judge Country Neutral 
(0%)
Weak 
(50%)
Strong 
(100%)
Very Strong 
(125%)
Anger LR USA 0.7 68.7 82.1 89.3
 ES USA 8.0 63.9 88.0 80.1
 BM USA 0.7 40.0 63.5 65.6
 AF USA 4.6 45.0 74.8 78.2
  Average USA 3.5 54.4 77.1 78.3
 LR JPN 0.0 80.8 90.9 92.3
 ES JPN 6.5 87.2 91.0 85.7
 BM JPN 2.6 16.9 18.2 35.9
 AF JPN 1.3 47.4 68.8 74.0
  Average JPN 2.6 58.1 67.2 72.0
  Average Anger 3.1 56.3 72.2 75.2
Happiness EA USA 47.9 87.4 95.4 97.4
 TA USA 62.4 94.6 97.3 97.4
 JL USA 11.3 92.1 97.3 100.0
 LK USA 9.3 90.7 96.7 97.3
  Average USA 32.7 91.2 96.7 98.0
 EA JPN 39.7 64.1 89.7 97.4
 TA JPN 64.5 92.3 98.7 97.4
 JL JPN 18.2 75.3 100.0 100.0
 LK JPN 11.5 80.8 100.0 96.1
  Average JPN 33.5 78.1 97.1 97.7
  Average Happiness 33.1 84.7 96.9 97.9
Sadness NH USA 4.7 63.6 91.9 87.3
 CF USA 5.3 65.3 78.7 81.5
 JC USA 3.3 34.4 68.9 80.1
 DC USA 2.0 25.2 67.3 68.2
  Average USA 3.8 47.1 76.7 79.3
 NH JPN 2.6 46.2 78.2 65.4
 CF JPN 3.9 60.3 55.8 62.3
 JC JPN 7.8 51.9 41.0 59.0
 DC JPN 0.0 11.7 57.1 46.1
  Average JPN 3.6 42.5 58.0 58.2
  Average Sadness 3.7 44.8 67.4 68.8
Surprise AG USA 1.4 56.7 85.2 82.1
 JG USA 0.0 32.4 97.4 93.4
 KK USA 3.3 67.5 89.3 90.1
 MM USA 1.3 68.0 94.0 95.3
  Average USA 1.5 56.2 91.5 90.2
 AG JPN 2.6 43.6 83.1 87.0
 JG JPN 0.0 28.2 93.6 96.1
 KK JPN 3.8 88.3 97.4 97.4
 MM JPN 0.0 69.2 94.8 97.4
  Average JPN 1.6 57.3 92.2 94.5
  Average Surprise 1.6 56.8 91.9 92.4
Table 1
Percent of Observers Selecting the Emotion Category Intended by Each Expression
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We then computed four country by rating two-
way ANOVAs separately for each expression inten-
sity (Figure 1). All four were statistically significant 
or marginally significant, F(1, 211) = 5.51, p < .05, 
r2 = .03; F(1, 213) = 3.18, p < .08, r2 = .02; F(1, 
213) = 14.76, p < .001, r2 = .07; and F(1, 213) = 
21.57, p < .001, r2 = .09, for neutral, low, high, 
and very high intensity expressions respectively. 
Simple effects analyses indicated that on neutral 
expressions there were no differences between 
ratings of external display and internal feelings for 
Americans, F(1, 86) = 2.67, ns, r2 = .03; the Japa-
nese, however, rated internal feelings higher than 
external display, F(1, 77) = 19.44, p < .001, r2 = 
.20. On low intensity expressions, both Americans 
and Japanese gave higher ratings to internal feel-
ings compared to external displays, but the size of 
these differences were significantly larger for the 
Japanese, F(1, 136) = 8.01, p < .01, r2 = .085; 
and F(1, 77) = 17.08, p < .001, r2 = .18 for Ameri-
cans and Japanese respectively. On high and very 
high intensity expressions both Americans and 
Japanese gave higher ratings to external displays 
than internal feelings, but the size of the differenc-
es were again significantly larger for the Japanese, 
F(1, 136) = 9.25, p < .01, r2 = .03l; F(1, 136) = 
15.66, p < .001, r2 = .10 for Americans, F(1, 77) = 
31.55, p < .001, r2 = .20, and F(1,77) = 54.42, p < 
.001, r2 = .42 for Japanese, for high and very high 
intensity expressions respectively. 
Cultural differences in display rules. We com-
puted a five-way ANOVA on the DRAI using country 
(2) and gender (2) as between subject variables 
and domain (2), emotion (7), and relationship (4) 
as within subject variables. Three effects involving 
the country factor were significant. The domain by 
country interaction, F(1, 193) = 11.00, p < .001, r2 
= .05, indicated that Japanese rated more control 
than did Americans in relation to what they should 
do, F(1, 208) = 6.69, p < .05, r2 = .03; but there 
was no difference in ratings of what they actually 
do, F(1, 203) = .04, ns. The emotion by country 
interaction, F(6, 1158) = 2.61, p < .05, r2 = 0, led 
to the finding that the Japanese reported greater 
control for anger and contempt, F(1, 212) = 4.26, 
p < .05, r2 = .02, and F(1, 207) = 6.84, p < .01, 
Figure 1
Interactions of Country by Rating Type Separately for each Expression Intensity
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r2 = .03, respectively. The relationship by country 
interaction, F(3, 579) = 5.90, p < .001, r2 = .01, led 
to the finding that the Japanese rated more control 
with their close friends, F(1, 205) = 16.03, p < .001, 
r2 = .07. 
The effects of display rules on cultural dif-
ferences in intensity ratings. We then recom-
puted the overall five-way ANOVA on the intensity 
ratings using the total DRAI score as a covariate. 
We used the total DRAI score because all cultural 
differences found on the DRAI were always in the 
same direction (Japanese exerting more control 
than Americans) and because all items were high-
ly correlated with each other (total DRAI alpha = 
.95). The country by rating by expression intensity 
interaction was still significant, F(3, 618) = 8.83, p 
< .001, r2 = .037, but the effect was much smaller 
than the original analyses, indicating that display 
rules mediated the relationship between culture 
and rating differences (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Comparison of the original effect size to the recom-
puted effect size indicated that 69% of the original 
effect was explained by country differences on dis-
play rules. In particular, the rating by total DRAI in-
teraction was statistically significant for both strong 
and very strong expressions, F(1, 210) = 5.68, p < 
.05, r2 = .026; and F(1, 210) = 4.59, p < .05, r2 = 
.021, respectively. 
Cultural differences in psychological cul-
ture. We computed a three-way ANOVA on the 
ICIAI ratings using country (2) and gender (2) as 
between subject factors and relationship (4) as a 
within subject factor. The country main effect was 
significant, F(1, 225) = 8.64, p < .01, r2 = .04, indi-
cating that Americans were more collectivistic than 
Japanese. The country by relationship interaction 
was also significant, F(3, 675) = 25.20, p < .001, 
r2 = .11; Americans endorsed collectivistic values 
more than did the Japanese in relation to family 
and close friends, F(1, 227) = 48.23, p < .001, r2 
= .18, and F(1, 227) = 24.74, p < .001, r2 = .10, 
respectively. 
We computed a three-way ANOVA on the SCS 
ratings using country and gender as between sub-
ject factors and scale (independent v. interdepen-
dent) as a within subject factor. The country by 
scale interaction was significant, F(1, 210) = 7.60, 
p < .01, r2 = .04. Americans had significantly high-
er scores on the independent self-construal scale, 
F(1, 215) = 25. 79, p < .001, r2 = .11, but there 
was no difference on the interdependent scale, F(1, 
213) = 1.84, ns. 
We computed a four-way ANOVA on the SDS 
ratings using country and gender as between 
subject factors and setting (work v. school) and 
relationship (3) as within subject factors. The only 
significant effect involving country was the country 
main effect, F(1, 219) = 68.17, p < .001, r2 = .31, 
indicating that Americans had significantly higher 
status differentiating scores than did the Japanese. 
The contribution of psychological culture to 
the cultural differences in intensity ratings when 
display rules are incorporated. We computed to-
tal scores for the ICIAI and the SDS based on the 
significant main effects of culture on both scales 
and the fact that the intercorrelations among the 
items were high (alphas for total ICIAI = .92, for 
total SDS = .92). Pearson correlations between 
the total ICIAI, SDS, and both SCS scales with total 
DRAI separately for Americans and Japanese in-
dicated that for Americans, SCS independent was 
negatively correlated with total DRAI, r(143) = -.15, 
p < .05, and total SDS was positively correlated 
with total DRAI, r(148) = .14, p < .05. No other 
correlations were significant. 
We then recomputed the overall ANOVA on 
the intensity ratings, using total DRAI, total ICIAI, 
total SDS, and both SCS scores as covariates. The 
country by expression intensity by rating interac-
tion was still significant, F(3, 555) = 4.21, p < .01, 
r2 = .02, and comparison of the associated effect 
size with the original indicated that the psycholog-
ical culture variables accounted for an additional 
14% of the original culture by expression intensity 
by rating effect size over and above that accounted 
for by display rules.
Other judgment results. The rating type by 
expression intensity interaction, F(3, 477) = 60.89, 
p < .001, r2 = .24, indicated that the cultural dif-
ferences reported above qualified an effect that 
existed independent of culture. Simple effects 
analyses indicated that across both countries 
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judges tended to rate internal feeling higher than 
external display for neutral and weak expressions, 
but external displays higher than internal feelings 
for high and very high intensity expressions. When 
total DRAI was included as a covariate, the inter-
action was still significant, F(3, 618) = 25.09, p < 
.001, r2 = .10, and effect size analyses indicated 
that display rules accounted for 58% of the vari-
ance in the interaction. 
The emotion by country by rating type inter-
action was also significant, F(3, 627) = 8.66, p < 
.001, r2 = .03. We thus computed four country by 
rating two-way ANOVAs separately for each emo-
tion. The interactions were non-significant for an-
ger and sadness, F(1, 212) = 2.830, ns, and F(1, 
213) = 1.565, ns, respectively. For happiness and 
surprise, however, Japanese judges inferred sig-
nificantly less intensity in subjective experience rel-
ative to external display compared to Americans, 
F(1, 212) = 5.82, p < .05, r2 = .03, and F(1, 212) 
= 9.36, p < .01, r2 = .04, respectively. 
Because it was possible that judgments of 
non-intended emotions confounded the cultural 
differences in intensity ratings, we computed coun-
try by rating type ANOVAs separately for each ex-
pression including only those judges who selected 
the intended emotion category. Of the 48 compar-
isons (4 expressors x 4 emotions x 3 expression 
intensity levels; we chose not to analyze the neutral 
expressions because the associated percentages 
were negligible), 27 were statistically significant and 
in the directions reported earlier. In addition com-
putation of weighted means across the expressors 
and emotions within each expression intensity level 
indicated the same differences as those reported 
above. On low intensity expressions, there was no 
difference between American ratings of external 
display and internal feelings (means = 4.32 and 
4.46, respectively); Japanese, however, had higher 
ratings of internal feelings (means = 3.18 and 3.54 
for external and internal, respectively). On high and 
very high intensity expressions, both Americans and 
Japanese gave higher ratings to external display v. 
internal feelings, and the differences were larger for 
the Japanese (American means = 6.02 and 5.87 
for high intensity expressions, and 6.49 and 6.24 
for very high intensity expression; Japanese means 
= 5.38 and 4.81 for high intensity expressions, and 
6.13 and 5.28 for very high intensity expressions). 
Discussion, Study 1
That the Japanese inferred greater subjective 
experience relative to external display compared 
to American judges when judging low intensity 
expressions replicated the same finding reported 
by Matsumoto et al. (2002). The non-significant dif-
ference in rating type for American judges viewing 
neutral expressions also replicated the same find-
ing reported previously. That the Japanese inferred 
greater subjective experience when judging neutral 
expressions is new to this study but consistent with 
the notion that Japanese will infer greater subjec-
tive experience to low intensity expressions. That 
Americans viewing high and very high intensity 
expressions rated external display higher than in-
ternal experience also replicated the same findings 
reported previously. That the Japanese also did so 
when judging high and very high intensity expres-
sions is new to this study, and we have no post-
hoc interpretations for it. That this discrepancy was 
significantly larger for the Japanese compared to 
Americans, however, nevertheless indicated a cul-
tural difference on the rating types.
Covariance analyses indicated that display 
rules accounted for a substantial portion of the 
variance in the cultural differences in the ratings. 
This is, to our knowledge, the first evidence that 
directly links cultural differences in how people 
display emotions with how they perceive the emo-
tions of others. The psychological culture variables 
accounted for an additional proportion of the vari-
ance in cultural differences in ratings above and 
beyond the effects of cultural display rules. These 
findings qualify those reported by Matsumoto et 
al. (2002) where psychological culture accounted 
for practically the entire effect of culture on ratings. 
This finding also suggests that there are additional 
aspects of psychological culture not related to dis-
play rules that contribute to the culture by rating 
type interaction, and that there are aspects of this 
interaction not related to psychological culture or 
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display rules at all. The finding also suggests the 
possibility that dimensions of psychological culture 
other than those measured in this study may ac-
count for differences in judgments. Future theoriz-
ing and empirical work would be necessary to flesh 
out what these additional influences may be.
Americans were more collectivistic than the 
Japanese on the ICIAI, were more status differenti-
ating on the SDS, were no different than the Japa-
nese on interdependent self-construals, and were 
no different in ratings of what they actually do with 
regard to their emotional displays. Although some-
what surprising, these findings are commensurate 
with other individual-level studies of cultural values 
and attitudes related to collectivism, individualism, 
self-concept, and interpersonal consciousness, 
including not only questionnaires in which social 
comparisons may occur but also experiments in-
volving behavioral data, conducted by Japanese 
and non-Japanese researchers recruiting subjects 
from various areas of Japan all point to the same 
conclusion (Matsumoto, 2002b; Oyserman, Coon, 
& Kemmelmeier, 2002). Surveys conducted by 
the Japanese government on lifestyle, health, and 
work-related attitudes and values of working adults 
and people across a wide range of ages also point 
to the same conclusion (Matsumoto, 2002b). On 
the level of individuals, Japanese may not be more 
collectivistic than Americans, while such differenc-
es may exist on the cultural level.
Overview of Study 2
In recent years the concept of emotion regu-
lation (ER) has gained widespread importance. 
Roughly defined as the ability to control, man-
age, and modify one’s emotional experiences and 
expressions, ER can be achieved by a variety of 
mechanisms. Gross, for example, suggests that 
individuals can alter their appraisals of situations 
so as to manage their interpretations of the types 
of events that bring about emotion (Reappraisal) 
(J. J. Gross, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2002; J. J. Gross 
& Levenson, 1993). Alternatively people can also 
suppress their emotional expressions and reac-
tions (Suppression). 
The concept of display rules is related to ER 
because display rules also have to do with the 
management and modification of emotional ex-
pressions and reactions. That is, display rules can 
be considered one component of ER. Conceptu-
ally, as emotion involves a package of events in-
cluding cognitions, expressions, physiological re-
actions, and subjective experience, ER should refer 
to the degree to which each of these components 
are regulated. In Gross’ model, for example, Reap-
praisal may refer to one way in which cognitive reg-
ulation is achieved. Similarly, display rules should 
refer to the way in which expression regulation is 
achieved.
If display rules are conceptually linked to ER, 
and if display rules mediate the ways in which 
individuals perceive the emotions of others, then 
ER may also mediate those judgments. That is, 
people may differentiate the intensity of other’s 
external displays of emotions relative to presumed 
subjective experience on the basis of how they 
themselves regulate their expressions relative to 
their feelings. Individuals who are more likely to 
amplify their expressions relative to feelings may 
be more likely to perceive greater degrees of ex-
ternal displays relative to internal feelings. Con-
versely, people who are more likely to suppress 
their expressions relative to their feelings may be 
more likely to perceive greater degrees of internal 
feelings relative to external displays. 
We tested this idea in an American sample in 
Study 2. We were limited to testing American par-
ticipants because, to our knowledge, there is no 
measure of ER that has been validated for use in 
other cultures. And in any case the effect sizes re-
lated to the rating type by expression intensity in-
teraction in Study 1, especially compared to the ef-
fect size associated with the country by expression 
intensity by rating type interaction, suggested that 
the rating differences that occurred as a function of 
expression intensity were sufficiently robust to be 
tested in a single sample.
In Study 2, participants viewed the same stimuli 
as in Study 1 and made the same judgments. This 
time, however, they also completed two measures 
of ER. We hypothesized that the rating type by ex-
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pression intensity interaction would again be signif-
icant and that the measures of ER would mediate 
those differences.
Study 2
Methods
Participants. Eighty-six undergraduates (61 
females, 25 males, mean age = 22.97, sd = 6.27) 
were recruited from psychology classes at two uni-
versities in the San Francisco bay area and partic-
ipated in partial fulfillment of class requirements. 
Their ethnicities were as follows: 43.0% Caucasian, 
5.8% African or African-Americans, 19.8% Asian or 
Asian American, 7.0% Filipino, 5.9% Hispanic or 
Latinos, 1.2% Indians, and 1.2% Middle Eastern-
ers; 14.0% of the participants chose two ethnicities 
and 2.4% of the participants were unclassifiable. 
Facial stimuli and judgment tasks. The facial 
stimuli were the 48 neutral, low, and high intensity 
expressions used in Study 1. We dropped the very 
high intensity expressions because both in Study 1 
and in Matsumoto (2002) they were not associated 
with any findings that were different than what was 
found for high intensity expressions. The judgment 
tasks were the same three tasks utilized in Study 
1 as well as previous studies (Matsumoto et al., 
2002; Matsumoto, Kasri et al., 1999).
Emotion regulation measures. We used two 
measures of emotion regulation: the Emotion Ex-
pressivity Scale (EES) and the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ). The EES is a 17-item scale 
that assesses individual differences in the extent 
to which people outwardly display their emotions 
(Kring, Smith, & Neale, 1994). Previous research 
has demonstrated its temporal and internal reliabil-
ity, and convergent and discriminant validity. Par-
ticipants respond using a 6-point Likert scale from 
“never true” to “always true.” After reverse coding 
negatively loading items, a total score is computed 
by averaging all items (alpha = .92); higher scores 
reflect greater expressivity.
The ERQ is a 10-item scale that assesses the 
extent to which individuals typically try to inhibit 
their emotion-expressive behavior (J. J. Gross & 
John, in press). Previous research has demonstrat-
ed its reliability and validity. It is composed of two 
subscales: Reappraisal and Suppression. Partici-
pants rate each item using a 7-point scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The 
six reappraisal items and four suppression items 
are averaged to create a score for each (alphas = 
.77 and .82, respectively), with higher scores indi-
cating greater reappraisal and suppression. 
Procedures. The experiments were conducted 
in groups ranging in size from 10 to 22 people. Half 
the participants completed the EES, ERQ, and de-
mographic information before the judgment task; 
the other half completed judgment task first. The 
instructions for the judgment task were exactly the 
same as those used in Study 1. As in Study 1 three 
expressions not included in the study were used as 
practice so that participants would understand the 
judgments. There were no problems understand-
ing the nature of the judgment task. 
Main Results
Replication of the rating differences. We 
computed a four-way ANOVA on the intensity rat-
ings using gender (2) as a between subject vari-
able and expression intensity (3), emotion (4), and 
rating type (2) as within subject variables. As pre-
dicted the rating type by expression intensity inter-
action was highly significant, F(2, 164) = 21.42, p 
< .001, r2 = .21. Simple effects of rating indicated 
that there were no differences between external 
and internal ratings for neutral and low intensity 
expressions, F(1, 85) = 2.75, ns, r2 = .03, and F(1, 
85) = 1.33, ns, r2 = .01, respectively. Judges did, 
however, rate external displays significantly higher 
than internal feelings when judging high intensity 
expressions (Externalmean = 6.35, sd = .89, inter-
nalmean = 5.82, sd = 1.03), F(1, 85) = 28.93, p < 
.001, r2 = .25. The rating type by emotion by ex-
pression intensity interaction was also significant, 
F(6, 492) = 9.09, p < .001, r2 = .10; follow-up 
analyses indicated, however, the same pattern of 
findings as indicated by the rating by expression 
intensity interaction with only differences in degree 
across the emotions.
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The effects of ER on the rating differences. 
We then recomputed the overall ANOVA using 
ERQ Suppression, ERQ Reappraisal, and the EES 
as covariates. This time the rating type by expres-
sion intensity interaction was not significant, F(2, 
158) = 1.64, ns, r2 = .00, indicating that the emo-
tion regulation measures strongly mediated the dif-
ferences between the rating types across expres-
sion intensities (Baron & Kenny, 1986), accounting 
for 100% of the original rating type by expression 
intensity effect size. The rating type by emotion by 
expression intensity was also not significant, F(6, 
492) = 1.73, ns, r2 = .02, indicating that individu-
al differences in emotion regulation accounted for 
80% of the original variance in these differences.
Other results. We examined the degree to 
which demographic variables may have influ-
enced the findings in two ways. For all scalar da-
ta, Pearson correlations were computed between 
the demographic variable and the difference score 
between ratings of external display and internal 
feelings on the high intensity expressions. For 
nominal demographic data, we computed ANOVAs 
on the difference scores using the demographic 
categories as independent variables provided that 
there were n > 20 cases in each cell. None of the 
analyses from either method was statistically signif-
icant, indicating that demographic differences did 
not confound the findings reported above.
The rating type by emotion interaction was also 
significant, F(3, 246) = 5.04, p < .01, r2 = .055. 
Follow-up analyses indicated that judges rated ex-
ternal displays higher than internal experience on 
anger, happiness, and surprise, F(1, 85) = 6.43, p 
< .05, r2 = .07; F(1,85) = 4.87, p < .05, r2 = .05; 
and F(1, 85) = 6.52, p < .01, r2 = .07, respectively. 
When the emotion regulation scores were used as 
covariates, however, the interaction was not signif-
icant, F(3, 237) = .43, ns, r2 = .005, indicating that 
91% of the original variance in this interaction was 
accounted for by ER. 
Discussion, Study 2
The rating differences occurred in this study 
exactly as they did in Study 1 and in Matsumoto 
et al. (1999; 2002). On neutral and low intensity ex-
pressions, there were no differences between rat-
ings of external display and internal experience. On 
high intensity expressions, however, judges rated 
external displays significantly higher than internal 
experience. Moreover, this effect was mediated 
strongly by individual differences in ER; when ER 
measures were included as covariates, the effect 
disappeared entirely. ER also mediated a number 
of other rating differences in the judgments.
Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 by 
utilizing two measures of ER as a substitute for 
display rules, and supports the notion that the de-
grees to which individuals regulate their emotions 
in general, and their emotional expressions in par-
ticular, affect how they judge emotions in others. 
An argument could be made that the two rating 
types – of external displays and internal experi-
ence – are themselves judgments of others’ ER or 
display rules. That is, if ER and display rules refer to 
the degree to which people modulate their expres-
sions relative to their experiences, the difference 
between the strength of one’s external display and 
true internal experience is reflective of one’s ER 
or display rules. Judgments of these can then be 
considered judgments of other people’s ER, and 
the findings of these studies therefore suggest that 
individual’s own, personal rules of display or emo-
tion regulation influence how they perceive other 
people’s attempts at ER or display management.
General Discussion
This article reports the first evidence of a link 
between display rules and emotion regulation with 
differences in ratings of the external display v. pre-
sumed subjective experience of others. These stud-
ies were not conducted without limitation, including 
the limited number of emotions tested, the artificial 
nature of the stimuli involved, and the lack of context 
information about the expressions that may affect 
such judgments. Future studies should take care 
to extend these findings by testing other emotions, 
using videotapes of real-life expressions imbedded 
within context for a greater understanding of the na-
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ture of the differences in intensity ratings and the 
mediational effects of display rules on them.
Regardless of these limitations, however, the 
judgment differences reported replicate previous 
findings and are reliable. That a link between dis-
play rules and judgments exists makes conceptu-
al sense, as behaviors that are socialized during 
enculturation may serve as the basis for cultural 
and personal filters that are used to interpret and 
evaluate the behaviors of others in our world. This 
notion is congruent with studies of emotional in-
telligence that have demonstrated correlations 
between emotion identification and emotion man-
agement, two accepted components of emotional 
intelligence (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). 
This notion is also congruent with studies examin-
ing the relationship between personality and emo-
tion recognition accuracy (ERA) that have reported 
a correlation between the dimensions of openness 
and conscientiousness and ERA (Matsumoto et 
al., 2000). Assuming the dimensions of openness 
and conscientiousness themselves are related 
to meaningful real-life behaviors, such data also 
suggest a linkage between behaviors and judg-
ments of others. And a link between display rules 
and judgments is congruent with findings from 
research dating 30 years earlier demonstrating a 
correlation between ERA and emotion expressivity 
(Lanzetta & Kleck, 1970; Levy, 1964; Zuckerman, 
Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1976; Zuckerman, Lar-
rance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979). To be 
sure, though, emotional intelligence and ERA focus 
on emotion categorical emotion judgments, not 
judgments of expression management as we ob-
tained in the studies reported here. In that sense, 
therefore, the findings reported here are unique to 
the field. 
These findings open the door to confirming 
these notions across the age span. Developmental 
research on display rules has been conducted for 
over 20 years (Gnepp & Hess, 1986; Saarni, 1979; 
Zeman & Garber, 1996), as well as developmen-
tal research on judgments of emotion (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971; D. Gross & Harris, 1988; Izard, 1992; 
Matsumoto & Kishimoto, 1983). The findings from 
the studies reported here suggest a merging of 
these two lines of inquiry in the same participants 
across the age ranges to examine the degree to 
which display rules and emotion regulation are in-
deed linked to emotion judgments in socialization. 
Such links across the age range in socialization 
and enculturation, if they are to be found, would 
provide new platforms by which concepts such as 
ethnocentrism could be understood. 
These findings also open the door to examina-
tions of other similar links with other types of social 
and person perception. Social judgments, attribu-
tions, interpersonal perception, and other such 
processes are well studied topics in psychology, 
and future research should examine the degree to 
which one’s own behaviors mediate judgments of 
the same behaviors in others.
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Πολιτισμός, Κανόνες Έκφρασης Συναισθήματος 
και Κρίσεις Συναισθήματος 
DaviD MatsuMoto1, Jungwook Choi1, satoko hirayaMa1
akihiro DoMae2 & susuMu yaMaguChi2
ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ
Στο άρθρο αυτό περιγράφονται δύο μελέτες που δείχνουν ότι οι πολιτισμικοί κα-
νόνες έκφρασης συναισθήματος (Μελέτη 1) και η συναισθηματική ρύθμιση (Mελέ-
τη 2) συνδέονται με τις κρίσεις διαχείρισης των συναισθηματικών εκφράσεων των 
άλλων. Στη Μελέτη 1, Αμερικανοί και Ιάπωνες κριτές είδαν πρόσωπα σε τέσσερα επίπεδα έντασης, βαθμο-
λόγησαν την ένταση της εξωτερικής έκφρασης και υπέθεσαν την εσωτερική εμπειρία. Επίσης, συμπλήρω-
σαν ψυχομετρικές κλίμακες πολιτισμικών κανόνων έκφρασης και ψυχολογικού πολιτισμού. Οι πολιτισμικοί 
κανόνες έκφρασης αποτέλεσαν το 69% της διακύμανσης στις πολιτισμικές διαφορές στην αξιολόγηση της 
έντασης έκφρασης του συναισθήματος. Ο ψυχολογικός πολιτισμός αποτέλεσε το 14% της διακύμανσης. 
Στη Μελέτη 2, οι Αμερικανοί κριτές είδαν τα ίδια πρόσωπα και έκαναν τις ίδιες βαθμολογήσεις. Αυτή τη φορά 
όμως, συμπλήρωσαν δύο κλίμακες της συναισθηματικής ρύθμισης. H συναισθηματική ρύθμιση εξήγησε 
σχεδόν όλες τις διαφορές βαθμολόγησης σε όλα τα επίπεδα έντασης της έκφρασης. Οι μελέτες αυτές κα-
ταγράφουν την πρώτη τεκμηρίωση –εξ όσων μπορούμε να γνωρίζουμε- της σύνδεσης μεταξύ των κανόνων 
έκφρασης του ατόμου και τη συναισθηματική ρύθμιση και των κρίσεων διαχείρισης του συναισθήματος σε 
άλλους.
Λέξεις-κλειδιά:  Πολιτισμός, κανόνες συναισθηματικής έκφρασης, συναισθηματική ρύθμιση, κρίσεις συναι-
σθημάτων, εκφράσεις προσώπου.
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